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The Effect of Franchising Agreements on the 
EEC'S Competition Policy: Do Franchise 
Agreements Promote the Objectives of Economic 
Integration within the EEC or Hinder it? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) signed 
the Treaty of Rome (Treaty), they attempted to create a free market system 
throughout the EEC.I Article 85(1) was the main provision designed to prevent 
anti-competitive behavior created by distribution contracts, exclusive licensing 
agreements or other business arrangements. 2 Article 85(1) contains prohibitions 
against restrictions on competition, which either the European Commission 
(Commission) or a private party, through a court action, can declare void 
pursuant to Article 85(2).3 Article 85(3), however, provides exemptions for many 
business arrangements which Article 85(1) would declare void as a restraint on 
competition.4 The Commission extended block exemptions under Article 85(3) 
to patent licenses and other cooperative arrangements designed to initiate tech-
nological breakthroughs.s The recent development of franchise agreements in 
the EEC which affect the competition policy of the EEC, led the Commission 
to discuss methods for dealing with the spread of franchising in the EEC. 
During the early 1970s, European businesses followed the example of U.S. 
businesses and established franchise networks in the EEC.6 Franchise agree-
ments are contractual arrangements establishing commerical cooperation be-
tween two independent entities. According to such an agreement the franchisor 
grants either one or a group of franchisees, the right to use the franchisor's 
I Sutherland, Franchi" Agreements under EEC Competition Rules, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 10,776 
at 11,806 (1986) [hereinafter Sutherland]. 
2 See id. 
S Empel, Franchising in the EEC: Pronuptia et Post, 20.J. WORLD TRADE L. 401, 401, 403 (1986) 
[hereinafter Empel). 
; [d. at 401, 403; ,ee Sutherland, wpm note I, at 11,806. 
5 Sutherland, supra note I, at 11,806. 
fi Pronuptia de Paris GmbH, Plaintiff v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, Defendant, Common 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,245 at 16,444 (1986). In the Federal Republir of Germany, the number of 
franchise systems increased from 85 (with 11,000 franchises) in 1978 to 200 (with 120,000 franchises) 
in 1982. [d. In France, the franchise system grew from 300 franchises in 1981 to 500 franchises in 
1985. [d. 
113 
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trademark or name and other characteristics of its business in the sale of goods 
and services. 7 The franchisee uses the marketing strategy and business arrange-
ment established by the franchisor to sell goods and in exchange pays the 
franchisor royalties.s The franchisor controls certain aspects of the franchisee's 
business to provide the public with a uniform quality and presentation of goods 
and services.9 Franchises provide the franchisor with a uniform distribution 
network without the need to invest large sums of money in setting up its own 
retail outlets. 1O Neither the member states nor the Commission have yet enacted 
any legislation governing or defining franchise agreements. The recent case of 
Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Firma Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis (Pronuptia), 
however, seriously questions the validity and use of franchise agreements with 
respect to the competition policy of the EEC.ll 
This Comment discusses whether franchise agreements promote or hinder 
the competition policy of the EEC. First, the Comment focuses on the Pronuptia 
case and briefly discusses the court's decision and analyzes the effects of fran-
chise agreements on the competition policy of the EEC.12 Second, it discusses 
the Commission's expected response to the Pronuptia decision. This discussion 
is based on the speech given by Peter Sutherland, EEC Commissioner of Com-
petition Matters, concerning the compliance of franchise agreements with the 
competition policy of the EEC.13 Finally, the Comment concludes with an as-
sessment of whether franchise agreements hinder or promote the competitive 
aims of the Treaty. 14 
II. THE PRONUPTlA DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON FRANCHISE 
AGREEMENTS IN THE EEC 
A. Background 
The Pronuptia case dealt with a dispute between Pronuptia de Paris GmbH 
Frankfurt au Main (Franchisor), a subsidiary of the French company of Pron-
uptia de Paris, and Mrs. Schillgalis (Franchisee), over the franchisee's duty to 
pay royalities to the franchisor for 1978 through 1980. 15 Pronuptia de Paris, 
the French parent company of the Franchisor, produces wedding attire under 
7 [d. at 16,445. 
x !d. 
Y!d. 
10 [d. 
II !d. at 16,447. 
12 See infra notes 15-83 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text. 
I, See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text. 
15 Pronuptia at 16,435. 
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the name "Pronuptia de Paris."16 The distribution of the Pronuptia de Paris 
products in the Federal Republic of Germany is handled by shops operated by 
the Franchisor, or by independent retailers through franchise agreements with 
the Franchisor for the parent company. 17 The Franchisee sold bridal attire and 
other women's clothing products in Hamburg under the name Pronuptia de 
Paris. IS 
On February 24, 1980, the Franchisee obtained franchises through three 
separate contracts with the Franchisor for the areas of Hamburg, Oldenburg, 
and Hannover. 19 The Franchisor had three obligations under the contract. First, 
the Franchisor granted the Franchisee exclusive rights to market her goods and 
services and the right to advertise under the name of Pronuptia de Paris in a 
specific territory.2o Second, the Franchisor promised not to open any shops or 
provide any goods or services to another person in the specified territory of the 
franchisee. 21 Finally, the Franchisor agreed to assist the Franchisee with business 
arrangements, marketing strategy, and other means designed to improve the 
profitability of the franchisee's business.22 
More specifically, the Franchisee agreed to assume all the risks of opening a 
franchise as an independent retailer. The Franchisee also agreed to the follow-
ing additional business arrangements. First, the Franchisee agreed to sell Pro-
nuptia de Paris goods only in the shop specified in the contract and to decorate 
and design the shop according to the Franchisor's instructions.23 Second, the 
Franchisee agreed to purchase eighty percent of her wedding related attire and 
accessories and a proportion of her cocktail and evening dresses from the 
franchisor, and to purchase the rest of her merchandise from only those sellers 
approved by the Franchisor.24 Third, the Franchisee agreed to pay a one time 
entrance fee of DM 15,000 (U.S. $8,205) for exclusive rights to the specified 
territory and a yearly royalty fee of ten percent of the total sales of Pronuptia 
products and all other goods. 25 Fourth, the Franchisee agreed to advertise only 
with the Franchisor's approval in a method which enhances the international 
reputation of the franchise. 26 Fifth, the Franchisee agreed to make the sale of 
bridal fashions her main business purpose.27 Sixth, the Franchisee agreed to 
16 !d. at 16,435-36. 
17 ld. at 16,436. 
I'ld. 
IOld. 
20 !d. 
21 ld. 
22 [d. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. 
25 ld. 
251d. 
2i [d. 
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consider the retail price recommendations of the franchisor when freely estab-
lishing her own prices.28 Seventh, the Franchisee agreed to refrain from com-
peting directly or indirectly during the contract period or for one year afterward 
with any Pronuptia shop.29 Specifically, the Franchisee agreed not to open a 
shop in an area outside the specified territory or within the specified territory 
after the end of the contract period.3o Eighth, the Franchisee agreed to obtain 
prior approval of the Franchisor before assigning the rights and obligations 
arising under this contract to a third party.31 
The first court to hear the case ruled in favor of the franchisor in the amount 
of DM 158,502 (U.S. $86,700) for arrears on royalty payments from 1978 
through 1982.32 The Franchisee appealed to the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt au 
Main, attempting to reverse the first court's decision, argued that the franchise 
agreement violated Article 85( 1) of the Treaty.33 The Franchisee also argued 
that the block exemption provided to various exclusive dealing arrangements 
under Commission Regulation No. 67/67/EEC did not apply to franchise agree-
ments.34 In 1982, the Oberlandesgericht agreed with the Franchisee's argument 
28 [d. 
29/d. 
30 [d. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
33 [d. 
34/d. The applicable provisions of Regulation No. 67/67 are: 
Article I 
I. Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty and subject to the provisions of this Regulation, 
it is hereby declared that until 31 December 1982 Article 85( I) of the Treaty shall not apply 
to agreements to which only two undertakings are a party and whereby: 
(a) one party agrees with the other to supply only to that other certain goods for 
resale within a defined area of the Common Market; or 
(b) one party agrees with the other to purchase only from that other certain goods 
for resale; or 
(c) the two undertakings have entered into obligations, as in (a) and (b) above with 
each other in respect of exclusive supply and purchase for resale. 
Article 2 
I. Apart from an obligation falling within Article I no restriction on competition shall be 
imposed on the exclusive dealer other than: 
(a) the obligation not to manufacture or distribute, during the duration of the 
contract or until one year after its expiration, goods which compete with the goods 
to which the contract relates; 
(b) the obligation to refrain, outside the territory covered by the contract, from 
seeking customers for the goods to which the contract relates, from establishing any 
branch, or from maintaining any distribution depot. 
2. Article I (I) shall apply notwithstanding that the exclusive dealer undertakes all or any 
of the following obligations: 
(a) to purchase complete ranges of goods or minimum quantities; 
(b) to sell the goods to which the contract relates under trademarks or packed and 
presented as specified by the manufacturer; 
(c) to take measures for promotion of sales in particular: 
-to advertise 
-to maintain a sales network or stock of goods; 
-to provide aftersale and guarantee services; 
-to employ staff having specialized or technical training. 
Empel, supra note 3, at 408. 
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and declared that the contracts restricted competition. 35 The court held that 
the contracts failed to permit the Franchisor to distribute to other dealers in 
the specified territory, because the contracts limited the Franchisee's ability to 
purchase and sell goods within the member states. 36 The court concluded that 
Article 85(3) did not exempt the contracts from the prohibitions of Article 85(1) 
against anticompetitive behavior and declared the contracts void under Article 
85(2).37 The Franchisor appealed the Oberlandesgericht court's decision to the 
Bundesgerichtshof, the highest court in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
argued that the trial court's judgment should be upheld.38 The Bundesgerichtshof 
decided that the issues in the case involved EEC law and requested that the 
European Court decide the preliminary questions involving Community law.39 
The Bundesgerichtshof sent three questions to the European Court concerning 
the applicability of EEC competition policy to franchise agreements. The first 
question dealt with the applicability of Article 85(1) to franchise agreements 
defining a special distribution system.40 The second question, if the court affir-
matively answered the first question, was whether Regulation No. 67/67/EEC 
applied to exempt certain exclusive dealings such as the Pronuptia contract 
from the restrictions on competition contained in Article 85(1).41 If the court 
responded positively to the second question, the third question dealt with the 
specific application of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC to contracts similar to the 
Pronuptia franchise agreement. 42 These questions forced the court to decide 
35 Pronuptia at 16,436-37. 
36 !d. at 16,437. 
37 Id. 
"Id. 
39 !d. 
40 ld. The first question specifically asked the following: 
!d. 
I. Is Article 85( I) of the EEC Treaty applicable to franchise agreements such as the contracts 
between the parties, which have as their object the establishment of a special distribution 
system whereby the franchisor provides to the franchisee, in addition to goods, certain trade 
names, trademarks, merchandising material and services? 
41 !d. The second question specifically asked the following: 
2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative: Is Commission Regulation No. 67/671 
EEC of March 22, 1967, on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories 
of exclusive dealing agreements (block exemption) applicable to such contracts? 
!d. 
421d. The third question specifically asked the following: 
3. If the second question is answered in the affirmative: 
(a) Is Regulation No. 67/67 still applicable if several undertakings which, though legally 
independent, are bound together by commercial ties and form a single economic entity for 
the purposes of the contract participate on one side of the agreement? 
(b) Does Regulation No. 67/67, and in particular Article 2(2)(c) thereof, apply to an obli-
gation on the part of the franchisee to advertise solely with the prior agreement of the 
franchisor and in a manner that is in keeping with the latter's advertising, using the publicity 
material supplied by him, and in general to use the same business methods? Is it relevant in 
this connection that the franchisor's publicity material contains price recommendations which 
are not binding? 
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whether franchise agreements hinder or promote the competition policy of the 
EEC contained in the treaty. 
B. The Court's Analysis 
1. Franchise Agreements Compatibility with the Competition Policy of 
Article 85( I) 
The European Court declared that the applicability of Article 85( I) restric-
tions against competition to distribution franchise agreements depends on the 
provisions of the contract. 43 The court recognized that franchise agreements 
are not designed to restrict competition, but that the provisions of the agreement 
could restrict competition.44 It held that for a franchisee to succeed the following 
elements must be present. 
First, the franchisees must receive the necessary knowledge about the fran-
chisor's business practices and trade secrets, and the franchisor should provide 
the necessary assistance to enable the franchisees to operate their businesses 
according to the franchisor's business practices.45 In return, the agreement 
should provide the franchisor with provisions that protect the trade secrets and 
business practices of the franchisor from benefiting its competitors.46 These 
provisions are essential for the success of the franchise and do not violate Article 
85(1 ).47 The provisions in the Pronuptia contract, which require the franchisee 
to obtain approval of the franchisor prior to transferring her shop to a third 
party, protects the franchisor's disclosure of its trade secrets and any assistance 
provided to the franchisee from benefiting the franchise's competitors.48 
Second, the European Court allowed the franchisor to control the franchisee 
in order to protect the name and reputation of the network bearing its business 
name or symbol without restricting competition and violating Article 85(1) 
/d. 
(c) Does Regulation No. 67/67, and in particular Articles 1(1)(b), 2(1)(a), and 2(2)(b) thereof, 
apply to an obligation on the part of the franchisee to confine the sale of the contract goods 
exclusively or at least for the most part to particular business premises specifically adapted 
for the purpose? 
(d) Does Regulation No. 67/67, and in particular Article 1(1)(b) thereof, apply to an 
obligation on the part of the franchisee-who is bound to purchase most of his supplies from 
the franchisor-to make the rest of his purchase of goods covered by the contract solely from 
suppliers approved by the franchisor? 
(e) Does Regulation No. 67/67 sanction an obligation on the franchisor to give the franchisee 
commercial, advertising and professional support? 
43 See Pronuptia at 16,437-38. 
44 [d. at 16,438. 
45/d. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. 
48/d. at 16,439. 
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prohibitions against such restrictions. 4Y The franchise's reputation depends on 
the consumer's perception of it. This is why provisions governing the decoration 
and layout to create a similar atmosphere in each store of the franchise are not 
restrictions on competition under Article 85(1).50 In addition, the franchisee's 
location can and does affect the reputation of the franchise. 51 Consequently, 
the court held that any provision requiring franchisor's approval of a change 
in location is designed to protect the reputation of the franchise and is not 
anticompetitive under Article 85(1).52 
In addition, the ownership of a franchise can affect the franchise's reputa-
tion.53 Thus, the provision requiring the franchisee to obtain prior approval of 
the franchisor before assigning the rights and obligations under the contract to 
a third party protects the reputation of the franchise and is not anticompeti-
tive. 54 The public expects the same quality and selection of goods provided by 
each franchise in the network, and thus provisions designed to give the fran-
chisor control over the franchisee's goods available for sale, enhance the repu-
tation of the franchise and are not anticompetitive. 55 Finally, the advertising of 
a franchise reflects the image the franchise wants to portray for itself, and thus 
any provision requiring the franchisor to approve the nature of the franchisee's 
advertising does not affect competition. 56 Thus, many of the restrictions placed 
on the franchisee by the franchisor do not violate the competitive policy of the 
EEC, but instead enhance the franchise system and consumer satisfaction. 
2. Provisions Which Restrict Competition and Violate Article 85(1) 
Prohibitions against Restraints on Competition 
In answering the first question presented to it by the Bundesgerichtshof, the 
European Court held that any provision in a franchise agreement designed to 
prevent franchisees from competing in the same market or from offering goods 
at different prices restricts competition.57 The Pronuptia franchise agreement 
contains the following provisions affecting the territorial competition of the 
franchise. First, the franchise agreement prohibited the franchisee from selling 
goods in a shop other than the one specified in the contract.58 Second, the 
franchise agreement granted exclusive rights to the franchisee to market the 
49 Id. 
so Id. 
51 Id. 
S2 Id. 
53 Id. 
5. Id. 
55 Id. 
56Id. 
57 Id. 
58Id. 
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products of the franchise in a specific territory. 59 When viewed together, these 
provisions divide the market between the franchisor and franchisee and between 
the franchisees and inhibit intrabrand competition.60 The European Court cited 
Consten and Gruding v. Commission61 as support for the declaration that restric-
tions on intrabrand competition concerning a commonly known business name 
or symbol violates the competition policy of Article 85(1).62 In addition, provi-
sions which share markets even when the franchise is located in only one 
member state affect trade throughout the EEC.63 This is because such provisions 
restrict the franchisees from establishing commercial outlets in other member 
states.64 
The European Court also recognized that providing a franchise with a spec-
ified territory free from intrabrand competition creates sufficient incentives for 
the prospective franchisee to justify the risk of being part of the franchise 
network.65 The prospective franchise must invest substantial sums of its own 
money, pay an entrance fee, and pay a specified royalty each year to join the 
franchise network.66 The requirements necessary to open a franchise would 
deter any prospective franchisee from joining the franchise network, if the 
franchisee faced competition from other franchises in the network.67 
The European Court declared that any provisions granting the franchisor 
control over the franchisee's freedom to choose his own price is a restraint on 
competition.68 The Pronuptia franchise agreement, however, did not force the 
franchisee to blindly follow the franchisor's price, but only to consider the price 
recommendation of the franchisor in choosing its price.69 Price recommenda-
tions do not constitute price fixing between the franchisor and franchisee or 
among the franchisees. 7o The court, however, left the determination of whether 
the Pronuptia contract involved price recommendations or a concerted price 
movement between the franchisor and franchisee, and among the franchisees, 
to the national court. 71 The provisions of the franchise agreement which restrict 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Joined Cases No. 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
299. 
62 Pronuptia at 16,439. 
631d. at 16,440. 
64ld. 
651d. at 16,439. 
66ld. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 16,440. 
69 See id. 
70ld. 
711d. 
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price determination by the franchisees and partition markets are restrictions on 
competition under Article 85(1).72 
3. The Applicability of the Block Exemption Provided under Regulation 
No. 67/67/EEC through Article 85(3) to Franchise Agreements 
After deciding that the provisions restricting the territory of the franchise 
violated Article 85(1) as a restraint on competition, the European Court consid-
ered the second question presented to it by the Bundesgerichtshof. The second 
question concerned whether a block exemption under Regulation No. 67/671 
EEC applied to the Pronuptia franchise agreement. 73 If the block exemption 
applied to the franchise agreement, then the entire franchise agreement would 
be valid despite the violation of Article 85(1). The court carefully evaluated 
several aspects of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC with respect to franchise agree-
ments and concluded as follows. First, the court held that the block exemption 
applied to contracts specified in terms which covered obligations of supply and 
purchase. 74 The court, however, declared that the block exemption did not 
extend to contracts which covered the use of a single business name or symbol, 
or established uniform business practices, or created a distribution franchise 
arrangement. 7S Second, the language of Article 2 of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC 
states that it applies to exclusive dealing arrangements, and not to franchise 
agreements similar to the Pronuptia agreement. 76 Third, Article 2 provides 
restraints only on the exclusive dealer and not on the other party to the con-
tract. 77 A franchise agreement, however, places an obligation on the franchisor 
to provide knowledge and assistance to the franchisee. 7s Fourth, the require-
ments of Article 2(2) of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC do not require a distributee 
to pay royalties or permit the distributor to exercise the control necessary to 
maintain the identity and reputation of the network. 79 The court followed the 
opinion of the Commission and the French government and declared the block 
exemption under Regulation No. 67/67/EEC inapplicable to franchise agree-
ments. SO Thus, the court's determination that Regulation No. 67/67/EEC did 
not apply to franchise agreements meant that the court did not need to decide 
the particular application of the block exemption to the Pronuptia franchise 
72Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 16,441. 
75 !d. 
76 !d. 
77 !d. 
78 !d. 
79Id. 
80 !d. 
122 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XI, No. 1 
agreement.8! This decision requires the Commission to examine any agreement 
with a territorial partitioning or price setting provision to determine if the 
franchise agreement restricts competition under Article 85(1).82 The decision 
of the court compels the Commission to establish a policy which clarifies the 
continued existence and effective use of franchise agreements in the EEC.83 
Ill. THE COMMISSION'S EXPECTED PROPOSAL CONCERNING FRANCHISE 
AGREEMENTS STATUS IN RELATION TO EEC COMPETITION POLICY AS PROPOSED 
BY COMMISSIONER PETER SUTHERLAND 
Commissioner Sutherland maintains that the EEC's competition policy must 
be flexible and accommodate the economic reality of the EEC's business com-
munity.84 Sutherland recognizes that franchise agreements provide advantages 
to consumers by establishing a uniform distribution system with independent 
retailers running their own shop in an efficient manner. 85 Franchise agreements 
permit firms to develop across the borders of the member states of the EEC 
and create a common marketplace throughout the EEC.86 While Commissioner 
Sutherland recognizes the advantages associated with franchise agreements, he 
also acknowledges their limitations.87 Franchise agreements hinder competition 
when they include market share and resale price constraint provisions.ss 
Commissioner Sutherland explains that the Commission is considering a block 
exemption regulation for franchise agreements under Article 85(3).89 The Pro-
nuptia court decision stated that Regulation No. 67/67/EEC did not apply to 
franchise agreements, but left room for the Commission to create exemptions, 
under Article 85(3), pertaining to franchise agreements.90 The recently enacted 
Regulations No. 1983/83 and 1984/84 are similar to Regulation No. 67/67/EEC 
and will not exempt franchise agreements from the Article 85(1) prohibitions 
against restrictions on competition.9! Commissioner Sutherland, in his speech 
at the Euro Conference in Brussels, Belgium on March 25, 1986, did not outline 
a specific proposal, but instead gave a general orientation concerning the Com-
mission's plans for a block exemption concerning franchise agreements.92 
RI Id . 
• 2 Empel, supra note 3, at 413. 
83 Id.; Sutherland, supra note 1, at 11,808. 
84 Sutherland, supra note 1, at 11,806. 
85Id. at 11 ,807 . 
• 6Id . 
• 7Id . 
•• Id. 
89Id. at 11,808. 
90 Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
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First, the block exemption would comply with the decision of the Pronuptia 
court.93 The regulation would follow the court's decision.94 Thus, it would 
exempt an agreement which allows the franchisor to provide commerical know-
how and assistance to the franchisee, and in exchange provide the franchisor 
with sufficient control to protect the reputation and identity of the franchise 
system bearing his name or sign.95 The exemption would also apply to the 
provisions that the European Court did not consider restrictions on competi-
tion.96 
Second, resale price maintenance would never be included in a block exemp-
tion, since price competition is a basic feature of the free market system.97 Such 
franchisor control of the franchisee's price would restrict intrabrand competi-
tion and burden the consumer by having a price set either artificially high or 
low by the franchisor.98 If the franchisor allowed the franchisee to set the price, 
then the franchisee would set the price according to the supply and demand 
for the product in the particular market. 99 
Third, the block exemption would extend to provisions which prevent the 
franchisee from selling goods other than in its shop or prohibit it from opening 
a second shop.IOO Such a provision might restrict competition between the fran-
chisor and the franchisees or between the franchisees. 101 These provisions, 
however, provide incentives for franchisees to enter franchise agreements with-
out the risk of losing money because of competition from the franchisor or 
other franchisees in the franchisee's market. 102 In order for the block exemption 
to comply with Article 85(3) and contain restrictive sales provisions, the fran-
chisor must select franchisees based on "objective, non-discriminatory and uni-
formly applied criteria."103 
Fourth, the franchise agreement should allow franchisees to sell and purchase 
goods from each other anywhere in the EEC.104 A restriction on the resale 
provision between franchisees would violate the conditions of Article 85(3) and 
prevent the application of a block exemption to franchise agreements. 105 Like-
wise, a restriction on the freedom of franchisees to purchase and sell merchan-
9' Id. at 11,809. 
94Id. 
95/d. 
96 Id. 
97Id. 
98 See id. at 11,807, 11,809. 
99 See id. at 11,809. 
III°Id. 
1111 See id. 
102 See id. 
10' Id. 
104 Id. 
1115Id. 
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dise throughout the EEC would prevent the exercise of warranties on the 
products sold by the franchisees. 106 
Finally, Sutherland recognized that a number of provisions could be placed 
in the Commission's regulation, but he explained that the Commission instead 
will probably utilize the mechanism of opposition procedure. 107 The guidelines 
given by Sutherland present a fragmented picture of the Commission's inten-
tions concerning a regulation regarding franchise agreements. lOB The regulation 
suggested would permit franchise agreements containing provisions restricting 
the franchisee to the single outlet provided in the contract in order to promote 
competition in the EEC. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Franchise agreements promote and hinder the EEC's competition policy. 
Commissioner Sutherland, as mentioned earlier, recognized that franchise 
agreements permit business expansion without the risks associated with opening 
up subsidiaries. 109 He also recognized that franchise agreements can contain 
resale price maintenance clauses and territorial partitioning provisions which 
restrict competition. llo The block exemption advocated by Sutherland would 
not permit resale price maintenance. lll It would, however, allow provisions in 
the franchise agreement which forbid the franchisee from opening a shop other 
than the one provided for in the franchise agreement. 112 
The Pronuptia court ruled that any provision partitioning markets between 
the franchisor and the franchisee, or between franchisees, constituted a restric-
tion of competition for the purposes of Article 85(1).113 The court did recognize 
that partitioning the market provides an incentive to prospective franchisees to 
join the network and take the financial risk associated with joining it, without 
fearing competition from the franchisor or other franchisees. 1l4 The Pronuptia 
court's view that market partitioning restricts competiton under Article 85(1) 
does not prevent the Commission from establishing a block exemption which 
satisfies the conditions of Article 85(3), as long as the franchises are chosen on 
"objective, non-discriminatory and uniformly applied criteria." I 15 Thus, the pro-
1061d. 
107 [d. 
1081d. 
109 See id. at 11,806. 
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posed block exemption's only anticompetitive feature is its allowance of provi-
sions restricting the franchisee from opening a second shop. 
The proposed block exemption will deal with the lack of competition within 
the franchise network, by requiring the franchise agreements to allow for the 
free flow of goods between franchisees. Thus, while franchisees will not be able 
to compete with each other, they will be able to sell goods to one another. In 
addition, one franchisee will be able to sell the goods of another franchisee in 
its store. Thus, the franchise network, as established under the block exemption 
proposal, resembles the distribution system of a large chain operation. A large 
chain is interested in competing with the other manufacturers producing com-
peting goods and not with itself. Thus it establishes its outlets in locations where 
they will not compete with each other. The Commission will formulate the 
proposed block exemption to achieve the same goal of large chain organizations, 
which is to promote interbrand competition between franchises instead of in-
trabrand competition between a franchisor and its franchisees, or among its 
franchisees. Thus, the block exemption for franchise agreements will hinder 
intrabrand competiton in the EEC, while promoting interbrand competition 
throughout the EEC in compliance with the competitive policy of the Treaty. 
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